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INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 1985, members of a Palestinian group hijacked the passenger ship Achille Lauro. Not only did the hijackers hold more than
one hundred passengers and crew members hostage for several days, but
they murdered one of the passengers, Leon Klinghoffer, a United States
national.' On October 9 the hijackers released the vessel and remaining
hostages. On October 10 the hijackers and an alleged mastermind of the
operation, Mr. Abbas, were on board an Egyptian aircraft flying over
the high seas in the Mediterranean when United States military aircraft
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; A.B. (1965), J.D. (1968),
U.C.L.A.; LL.M. (1972), University of Virginia; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University;
Member, Independent Commission on Respect for International Law; Member, American Branch, International Law Association, Committee on International Terrorism; Former Member, American Society of International Law, Working Group on International
Terrorism (1975-1977); Former Chairman, A.B.A. Section on Internitional Law, Committee on International Law and the Use of Force (1975-1978).
1. See generally N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A12, col. 5; id., Oct. 14, 1985, at
A12, col. 3.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 20.235

intercepted the Egyptian aircraft and forced it to land in Italy.'
Italy took the hostage-takers into custody and eventually prosecuted
and convicted them.3 Nevertheless, Italy allowed the alleged mastermind
of the hijacking to escape to Yugoslavia on October 12 despite a United
States request to arrest Mr. Abbas provisionally pending a formal extradition request. According to certain Italian officials, Italy did not have
sufficient evidence to detain Mr. Abbas further and, in any case, his diplomatic passport in an assumed name entitled him to immunity.' While
Mr. Abbas was in Yugoslavia, the United States requested the Yugoslavian government to arrest him provisionally until the United States could
extradite him under a United States-Yugoslavia extradition treaty, but
Yugoslavian officials refused, apparently on the basis that Mr. Abbas
was entitled to diplomatic immunity." Later in 1986, however, Italy formally indicted and convicted Mr. Abbas in absentia.6 Today he remains
at large.
The Achille Lauro incident and subsequent Egyptian, United States,
Italian and Yugoslavian actions, among others, raise several international legal issues, including those concerning nation-state involvement in
international terrorism either before or after an incident and the obligations of nation-states with respect to effective implementation, invocation
and application of international criminal law. General questions involving jurisdictional competence and the process of extradition are perhaps
the most important of these issues. More specifically, were Egypt, Italy

2. See generally Documents Concerning the Achille Lauro Affair and Cooperation in
Combatting International Terrorism, 24 I.L.M. 1509, 1512-24, 1554-57 (1985); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at Al, col. 6; id., Oct. 12, 1985, at A9, cols. 1-2; id., Oct. 11,
1985, at Al, cols. 5-6, A10-12; id. Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
3. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at Al, col. 4, A6, col. 1. (Eleven were convicted
by Italy: six of "Kidnapping for terrorist ends" or "terrorist kidnapping," five others of
lesser crimes, four others were acquitted); id., Mar. 23, 1986, at A15, col. I (thirteen
indicted); L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, § 1, at 2, col. I (Italian juvenile court later sentenced a seventeen year old). The United States announced in July that it reserved the
right to seek extradition "once all Italian legal proceedings, including appeals, are ended." See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at A6, col. 4. The U.S. District Court in Washington D.C. issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Abbas on October 16, 1986. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
4. See generally N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1985, at A10, col. 1; Italy Frees "Notorious"
PalestinianLeader, Hous. Post., Oct. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
5. See generally U.S. Demands Arrest of Palestinian,Hous. Post, Oct. 14, 1985, at
1, col. 1.
6. See generally N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at Al, col. 4 (conviction); id., Mar. 23,
1986, at A15, col. 1 (indictment); see also id., Oct. 31, 1985, at Al, col. 1 (arrest
warrant).
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or Yugoslavia obliged to prosecute or to extradite all of the alleged hostage-takers and their co-conspirators or accomplices? Did Italy or Yugoslavia or both countries have a valid excuse for failing to arrest Mr.
Abbas or to extradite him to the United States? Can Italy still extradite
to the United States those whom it has convicted?
In view of the fact that the Achille Lauro was a vessel with Italian
registry and that those accused of hostage-taking or of complicitous involvement in such activity were within Italian territory, Italy clearly had
jurisdiction both to prescribe and to enforce not only its criminal law but
that of the international community.' Assuming that such jurisdictional
competence existed, was Italy obligated to exercise its authority in connection with alleged international crimes?
II.

PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION

As a general matter, Italy's obligation would have been either to initiate prosecution or to extradite those individuals whom the international
community might reasonably accuse of having committed violations of
customary international law or crimes of hostage-taking in violation of
the 1979 Hostages Convention [Hostages Convention]. 8 Article 8 of the
Hostages Convention expressly recognizes the duty of a signatory in
whose territory an alleged offender is found "to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution" if the country does

7. The bases for jurisdiction under international law would be territorial and universal. See generally Paust, FederalJurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialActs of Terrorism
and Nonimmunityfor Foreign Violators of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA and the
Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 201, 203, 211-14 (1983) [hereinafter
Paust, FederalJurisdiction].Acts of Mr. Abbas would also fit within the objective territorial circumstance. See id. at 204-09.
8. See generally id. at 195, 227-29. See also Yates, State Responsibility for
Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens in the Postwar Era, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 213, 231-35 (R. Lillich ed. 1983) ("denial of

justice" and state responsibility under customary international law occur if the nationstate "fails to take appropriate action to pursue and punish those responsible" for criminal conduct engaged in within such a state's jurisdiction against aliens), also quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 183
(1965); RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) 506 (reporters' note 2 to § 711) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (failure to act
vigorously and diligently to punish crimes against aliens can constitute a "denial of justice") [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT]; In re Janes (United States v. Mexico), 4 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 82, 86-87, 89-91, 94-97 (1925) (failure to apprehend and punish
wrongdoer). A pardon or grant of amnesty would have only tightened liability for "denial of justice." See, e.g., In re Janes, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 87, 90, 96.
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not extradite the alleged offender.' In the Achille Lauro incident Italy
9. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, art.
8, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1460 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hostages Converition]. Before the incident, Egypt, the United States and Yugoslavia were all signatories to
the Convention. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1986,
at 309; 24 I.L.M. 1500 (1985) (Yugoslavia on April 19, 1985). Italy ratified the Convention on March 20, 1986, after the incident, but before any extradition to the United
States. See 25 I.L.M. 1016 (1986). No obvious reason exists why article 8 of the Convention should not apply retrospectively when a new signatory such as Italy has within its
territory a person reasonably accused of having committed an offense over which other
signatories had jurisdiction at the time of the commission of such offense. This seems
especially so in view of the propriety of the Israeli prosecution of Eichmann in a forum
that did not exist at the time of his criminal activity. Not only did a competence to
prosecute in the new forum exist, but a duty to prosecute or extradite with respect to
crimes already committed existed as well. See generally Attorney General of Israel v.
Eichmann, [Jerusalem D. Ct. 1961], 36 Int'l L. Rep. 18 (1968), affd, [Israel Sup. Ct.
1962] 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277 (1968). See also Lubet & Reed, Extradition of Nazis from
the United States to Israel: A Survey of Issues in Transnational Criminal Law, 22
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 52-54 (1986).
Additionally, the language of the 1979 Hostages Convention expresses no exception to
article 8 obligations in the case of acts committed before ratification, and one should not
imply such an exception so as to thwart the general purpose of the treaty to assure
effective sanctions against those who commit the crime of hostage-taking. See also Lubet
& Reed, supra. Further, one should not imply such an exception when it would be
inconsistent with more general obligations not to tolerate impermissible acts of terrorism
and to respect and observe fundamental human rights. Moreover, extradition under an
extradition treaty ratified after the commission of an alleged crime is permissible and the
right to extradition includes extradition for prior crimes unless the treaty expressly excludes them. See, e.g., In re De Giacomo, 7 F. Cas. 366, 369-70 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874)
(No. 3,747) (treaty between United States and Italy).
In any event, Italy had signed the 1979 Hostages Convention on April 18, 1980, and
under customary international law, ratification generally relates back to the date of signature. See, e.g., Davis v. Concordia, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 280, 289 (1850); In re Metzger,
17 F. Cas. 232, 240 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511); cf., Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 32, 34-35 (1869) (treaty binds United States when signed but does not relate back
from date of ratification to date of signature so as to divest title already vested); United
States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 748-49 (1832) (stands for same proposition as
Haver, supra). Additionally, a state that has signed a treaty awaiting ratification can
take no action inconsistent with the major purposes of the treaty. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at
289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969); cf. id. at 690, art. 28 (unless "otherwise
established," a treaty as such does not apply retroactively to events "before the date of
the entry into force"). The United States accepts the view that the Vienna Convention is
presumptively to be customary. See, e.g., DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at Vol. 2,
Pt. III, introductory notes 1-2; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 951 (2d ed. 1981). In particular, article 18 is among the provisions that the international community considers to be customary. See, e.g., DRAFT RE-
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has generally done even more. The competent Italian authorities have
prosecuted most of the alleged hostage-takers found in Italian territory,
and although the Hostages Convention or customary law does not necessarily require convictions, Italy has now convicted most of the Achille
Lauro hostage-takers and complicitors. Thus, Italy would not have to
extradite such persons to the United States, although it may choose to do
so in the future.
Yet Italy did not bring one of the more infamous alleged offenders,
Mr. Abbas, into custody as article 6 of the Hostages Convention requires. Italy was certainly unwilling and is now unable to extradite Mr.
Abbas to the United States, but has it fulfilled its obligation under the
Hostages Convention by trying and convicting him in absentia? Perhaps
it has, but Italy may have violated a more general obligation under customary international law and the United Nations Charter: an obligation
not to tolerate, encourage or assist transnational acts of terrorism when it
refused to arrest Mr. Abbas. Nonetheless, did the subsequent trial in
absentia obviate any such impropriety?
As a general matter, one can argue that a refusal or failure to prosecute or extradite an alleged international terrorist involves an impermissible toleration of, encouragement of or assistance to unlawful terrorism
in violation of obligations of nation-states under the United Nations
Charter, if not also under customary international law.10 In the history
supra note 8, at Vol. 2, § 312(3) and reporters' note 6, quoting Report of
the International Law Commission ([1966] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 202) (appears
to be generally accepted), citing Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 7, p. 30 (1926); Dalton, Remarks, 78 PROC., AM. SoC. INT'L
L. 278 (1984) (quoting Secretary of State Rogers who "in his report to the President in
1971 characterized the rule in article 18 as 'widely recognized in customary international
law' "), also citing 1979 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 692-93.
10. See, e.g., Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 227-29; Paust, The Link
Between Human Rights and Terrorism And Its Implications Concerning the Law of
State Responsibility, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. (1987) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Paust, The Link]. The United Nations General Assembly has also affirmed "that
refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of persons
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to generally recognized norms of international law." G.A. Res. 2840, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971). Certain acts of terrorism in time of armed conflict or in the context of crimes
against peace may implicate such a form of state responsibility. For relevant purposes,
principles and obligations, see, e.g., U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1 (2)-(3), 55(c), 56.
Early in our history it was also recognized more generally with respect to "crimes
against mankind," "the State in which the guilty person lives ought not to obstruct" the
right of an injured State to punish the perpetrator. See I Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821),
STATEMENT,
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of the United States, the legal community has recognized a customary
obligation either to provide civil redress for the victims of international
crime or to punish the perpetrators found within a nation-state's territory.11 "If the nation refuse [sic] to do either, it renders itself in some
measure an accomplice in the guilt, and becomes responsible for the injury," echoed Justice Wilson in Henfield's Case.12 The "duty of every
government," an Attorney General recognized in 1797, is "to punish
with becoming severity all the individuals of the State," at least, who
13
commit infractions of the law of nations.
Clearly Italy could not punish all of the alleged perpetrators once it
had let some of them leave its territory. Did the subsequent trial in absentia mean that Italy had not impermissibly become "in some measure
an accomplice in the guilt" or that it had tolerated illegality? The question still remains. It seems clear, however, that by mere technical compliance with an obligation under article 8 of the Hostages Convention, a
nation-state may not necessarily fulfill more general obligations under
the United Nations Charter and customary international law. Importantly also, a state need not actively sponsor international terrorism in
order to implicate such forms of state responsibility with respect to
terrorism.

citing H.

GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, [THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] lib. 2,
cap. 21, sec. 3 (1625) (De Poenarum Communicatione). See also supra note 8 (denial of
justice and state responsibility).

11. See generally Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (Wilson, J., on circuit, charge to grand jury); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797); 1 Op. Att'y
Gen. 30, 32 (1793); f. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 106, 107 (1802); see also Bolchos v. Darrel, 3
F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) ("failure of justice"); THE FEDERALIST No. 80
(A. Hamilton) (denial or perversion of justice by judicial denial of standing or a remedy
can subject the United States to liability); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795) (foreign plaintiffs have a forum and a remedy by civil suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1350); 1781 Res. of
Continental Congress, 21 J. CONT. CONG. 1137 (states should allow the United States to
sue individuals who make the United States liable to foreign governments or to avoid
such liability); Report of the Committee on Human Rights, Am. Branch of the International Law Association, PROCEEDINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS 56, 57-58, 65 (19831984); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 739-40 (1980); Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the
Comments, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 81, 84-88, 90-92, 94, 99 & n.123 (1981) [hereinafter
Paust, Litigating Human Rights]; supra note 8.
12. 11 F. Cas. at 1108. See also Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 226 &
n.146.
13.

1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) (Lee, Att'y Gen.).
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III.

THE CLAIM OF DIPLOMATIC OR OTHER IMMUNITY

The Abbas affair raises another question that involves claimed diplomatic immunity from arrest and subsequent prosecution or extradition.
The claim is unacceptable, however, when an individual has committed
criminally sanctionable violations of international law. Not only does a
general precept of non-immunity for violations of international law exist,"' but courts have applied such a precept with respect to diplomats
who engaged in international criminal behavior. 1 5 Clearly Italy and Yu14. See Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 225-32. See also Draft Brief
Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity
for Violations of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49 (1985)
[hereinafter Draft Brie]; M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 700-03 (1961); Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 5
ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTs. 55, 56-58, 62-64, 69-70, 83, 85-86 (1975); infra note 64; 9 Op.
Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1859) ("sovereign who tramples upon the public law of the
world cannot excuse himself. ... ").
15. See, e.g., the case of Abetz (France, Cour de Cassation, 1950), reprinted in 46
AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 162 (1952); see also Faust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at
229-32; In re Weizsaecker, (The Ministries Case), 16 I.L.R. 344, 361 (1949) (diplomatic immunity applies only to legitimate acts of state and not to violations of international law - on the point, see also M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 14, at
702 n.537); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 725, 726 (1835), quoting I J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 44 (1826), quoting E. DE VATTEL, II THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 2, §
34 (1758) (Vattel thinks that a foreign consul should receive immunity from criminal
prosecution "unless he violates the law of nations by some enormous crime").
As the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg recognized in a clear and
trenchant manner generally determinative of such claims to immunity:
The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the
representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment ...
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg 1946), reprinted in 41
AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947). See also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY FM 27-10, THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE 181 (para. 506(b)), 183 (para. 510) (1956). For other relevant
cases, see, e.g., M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 14, at 702-03. The predominant expectation among textwriters is also that diplomatic immunity does not entitle
diplomats to any right, privilege or immunity with respect to violations of international
law, the law upon which such claims ultimately rest. See, e.g., Faust, FederalJurisdiction, supra note 7, at 231-32 & n.163. Such immunity protects them merely from violations of ordinary domestic law (and even such protection is not absolute). Indeed, no
treaty of any sort expresses an immunity of any kind for violations of international law.
The international criminal, even if a diplomat, is and remains hostis humani generis.
The fact that Italy, at the insistence of the United States, finally recognized the nonimmunity of Mr. Abbas for violations of international law despite his diplomatic passport
and status and tried and convicted him in absentia (see supra notes 4-6) adds to such
precedent and patterns of expectation.

242
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goslavia would have no excuse for any violation of their own obligations
even if Mr. Abbas had generally been entitled to diplomatic immunity
from prosecution for mere domestic crimes.
Can other countries try convicted individuals who have served their
sentences? Countries can do so because under customary law, no principle of double jeopardy concerning international crime exists."6 Thus,
other nation-states can also prosecute the international criminal. Moreover, a domestic statute of limitation or other attempted application or
grant of immunity cannot rightly obviate such a competence. 17 The international crimifial remains hostis humani generis and subject to the
universal jurisdiction of all nation-states.
Whether Italy has an obligation to extradite to the United States those
persons whom it has already prosecuted and convicted, however, remains
an entirely different question. With respect to such persons, at least, Italy has complied with any relevant obligation under the Hostages Convention18 and with any other extradition commitments under treaty law
with the United States. 9 In that sense, Italy has a general discretion
whether or not to extradite such persons to the United States. Moreover,
other aspects involving so-called "defenses" or justifications for the denial
of a request for extradition may condition the exercise of such discretion.
A.

The Double Jeopardy Claim

The first such defense involves a specific clause in the general extradition treaty between Italy and the United States that one might refer to as
the double jeopardy clause. Under article 6 of the Treaty, extradition
"shall not be granted when the person sought has been convicted, acquitted or pardoned, or has served the sentence imposed, by the Requested
Party for the same acts for which extradition is requested. ' 20 According
to the section-by-section analysis of the treaty contained in a report by
the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the article
follows "standard United States extradition treaty practice of barring ex-

16.

See, e.g., Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, PolitiINT'L L. 283, 285
& n.14 (1986) [hereinafter Paust, Aggression Against Authority].
17. See, e.g., id. at 284 & n.12.
18. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
19. See Extradition Treaty, United States-Italy, Oct. 13, 1983, arts. VI, VII, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1527, 1528 (1985). The 1979 Hostages Convention can also operate as an extradition treaty. See 1979 Hostages Convention, supra note 9, at art. 10,
paras. 2 and 3.
20. See 24 I.L.M. at 1528.

ide and Other Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J.
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tradition . . . when . . . [the person] has been in prior jeopardy in the

requested country with respect to the same acts." 21
One might question whether the drafters of the treaty intended the
double jeopardy clause to change customary international law, under
22
which no prohibition of double jeopardy for international crime exists,

or whether the phrase double or prior jeopardy should even apply in the
case of prosecutions by separate sovereign entities, 23 but the treaty clause
is specific enough to demonstrate an intent to impose a new prohibition.
In fact, both the language of the treaty and its history have involved
references to violations of international law,24 so one would have difficulty arguing that article 6, unlike other portions of the treaty relates
merely to domestic or ordinary offenses.
Nevertheless, the clause could play havoc with a general obligation of
either Italy or the United States to not deny justice and to prosecute or
extradite persons that other countries have reasonably accused of having
committed an international crime, much less the general obligations of
all nation-states not to tolerate, encourage or provide assistance to international terrorism and to take action in order to ensure universal respect
for and observance of fundamental human rights. As such, the clause
seems inconsistent with customary obligations of nation-states and those
that several multilateral treaties proscribing various forms of individual
conduct (e.g., war crimes, acts of genocide, aircraft sabotage and hijacking) describe,25 especially the general prohibition of attempted grants
of immunity or pardons2" and general obligations under the United Nations Charter. If so, it would be policy-serving to interpret this and other
double jeopardy clauses in such a manner that they would not apply to

21. S. ExEc. REP. No. 33, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1531, 1533 (1986).
22. See supra text accompanying note 16.
23. It should not. See generally Heath v. Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 433, 437-38 (1985)
(state and state); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978) (Indian tribe and
federal goverment); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1959) (state and federal
government); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (state and federal government); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 13, 19-20 (1852) (state and federal); E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 120 (4th ed. 1967); McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683, 706-07 (1950).
24. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 19, at art. V(2), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at
1528 ("an offense ... pursuant to a multilateral agreement"); S. EXEC. REP. No. 33,
supra note 21, reprintedin 24 I.L.M. at 1533 (analysis of art. V(2): "acts of terrorism,
particularly those covered by multilateral treaties").
25. See, e.g., Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 195 & n.15, 227-32.
26. See supra text accompanying note 17. See also infra note 32.
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alleged violations of international law and to affirm this point in subsequent extradition treaties. Moreover, to the extent that bilateral double
jeopardy clauses are inconsistent with such customary or multilateral ob-

countries should hold the latter to prevail. In any event, interrelated obligations under the United Nations Charter and those obligations that the United Nations Charter mirrors must prevail in view of
the supremacy that article 103 of the Charter expressly recognizes. For
ligations,

these reasons, extradition to the United States for international crime

should still be permissible.
B.

The Political Offense Exception

Another potential problem involves the so-called political offense exception to extradition. 2 The Hostages Convention, for example, does not
27. For general background, see, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 370-429 (1974); Bassiouni, The Political Offense
Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 398 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1975). See also infra note 32; Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. (1987)
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Paust, Introduction]; Goldie, The "Political Offense" Exception and Extradition Between Democratic States, 13 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 53, 59-86
(1986).
Early in its history the United States recognized that "[t]o surrender political offenders
. ..is not a duty, but, on the contrary, compliance with such a demand would be considered a dishonorable subserviency to a foreign power, and an act meriting the reprobation of mankind." Letter from Secretary of State Marcy to Mr. Hulsemann of Austria,
Sept. 26, 1853, in F. WHARTON, II A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 483 (1887). See also J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND
INTERSTATE RENDITION 303-04 (1891); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66,
99-100 (1860) ("According to these usages,. . . persons who fled on account of political
offences were almost always excepted, and the nation . ..exercises a discretion ...
And the English Government . . .has always refused to deliver up political offenders");
In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 175, 188 n.1 (1847) ("'it is generally admitted that
extradition should not be granted in the case of political offenders, but only in the case of
individuals who have committed crimes against the Laws of Nature, the laws which all
nations regard as the foundation of public and private security' "), quoting W. PHILLIMORE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 413 (1854) and citing LAWRENCE'S WHEATON 232
(1863); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 997-1003 (N.D. Cal. 1894); United States v. Watts, 14
F. 130, 135 (D. Cal. 1882) ("It has been urgedthat the righ, of asylum for political
offenders is so universally recognized as sacred and inviolable that an infringement of it
was . . . not . . . possible. But jurists . . . are not always agreed as to what constitutes
a political offense"); In re Sheazle, 21 F. Cas. 1214, 1215 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
12,734) ("in case of mere political offences, it is seldom done," i.e., extradition); Oliver v.
Kauffman, 18 F. Cas. 657, 659 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497) ("the common law
and law of nations . . . refuse to deliver up persons guilty of mere political offences.");
Blandford v. State, 10 Tex. App. 627, 639 (1881); Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky.
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preclude a refusal to extradite under the political offense exception. Although there exists a general obligation to submit a case for prosecution
if a signatory does not extradite, article 10(2) recognizes that choice concerning extradition "shall be subject to the other conditions provided by
the law of the requested State." Not only does Italian law recognize the
propriety of the political offense exception,2" but the United States-Italy
extradition treaty, which is a part of Italian law, also recognizes the
possible use of such an exception.2 9 The general extradition treaty does
recognize, however, that it "will be presumed" that "an offense with
respect to which both Contracting Parties have the obligation to submit
for prosecution or to grant extradition pursuant to a multilateral international agreement," such as the Hostages Convention, is an ordinary or
nonpolitical offense.3 0 This is, nevertheless, merely a presumption.
In the actual circumstance Italy may find it nearly impossible to argue
that relevant crimes were political in view of the fact that Italy has arrested, prosecuted and convicted the individuals involved. The scintilla of
such a possibility, however, compels further comments about the exception. One should note that Italy apparently has an otherwise broad or
tolerant attitude about labeling politically motivated crimes as political
offenses. In the Zind case, for example, the Italian Court of Cassation
declared that in Italian law, "the expression 'political offence' includes
an ordinary offence committed wholly or in part for political motives,"
yet the motive "must go beyond the personal interests of the offender and
be concerned wholly or in part with wider interests connected with the
carrying into effect of different political ideals or theories" [or to impose
political or socio-economic solutions].3 1 Quite clearly, the acts of the Palestinian hostage-takers might fit within such a broad test.
Nevertheless, a growing number of commentators accept the point that
697, 706-07, 713 (1878). The first political offense exception that a United States treaty
recognized was in an 1843 treaty with France. See 8 Stat. 580, reprinted in 95 Parry's
T.S. 393; I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-16, 167-68 n.5
(1971).
28. See, e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Zind, 40 I.L.R. 214 (1961) (Italy, Cour de Cassation 1961).
29. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 19, at art. V(1), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at
1528.
30. See id., art. V(2), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at 1528.
31. See supra note 28. In the recent case of the Achille Lauro hostage-takers, the
lower court judge told reporters that Mr. Abbas and others had engaged in "a selfish
political act" designed "to weaken the leadership of Yasir Arafat." See N.Y. Times, July
11, 1986, at A6, col. 2. Commentators also reported, however, that the jury appeared to
accept defense arguments that some of the accused were "soldiers fighting for their ideals." Id., at Al, col. 4, A6, col. 1.
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courts must not treat violations of international law, especially international crimes, as mere political offenses even if the perpetrators of such
illegalities had political motives for their actions.3 2 A violation of fundamental human rights, for example, which are obligatio erga omnes (owing by and to all humankind), cannot rightly be immunized through this
or any other form of state labeling or action.3" Further, article VII of the
32. See, e.g., C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO
27 (1980); Bassiouni, An InternationalControl Scheme for the Prosecution of International Terrorism, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
EXTRADITION

485, 487 (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978) [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECTS]; Bassiouni,
Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17 AKRON L. REV.
495, 550 (1984); Dinstein, supra note 14, at 70; Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of
PoliticalOffenses in the Law of Extraditionand Asylum, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 371, 390,
394 (1953); Goldie, supra note 27, at 71; Kittrie, Patriots and Terrorists: Reconciling
Human Rights With World Order, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 291, 298-302 (1981);
Solf, Remarks, 79 PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 301 (1985). See also Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1981) (random, indiscriminate bombing is "not ... a protected political act even when . . . larger 'political' objective" exists), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981) ; In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("not. . . to
protect . . . acts that transcend the limits of international law"); Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, art. 14(2), G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (no asylum
allowed with regard to acts of persons engaged in "contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations," e.g., human rights violations); In re Bohne, V Jurisprudencia Argentina 339 (Sup. Ct. 1966), digested in 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1968)
(war crimes are not political offenses); In re Meunier, 2 Q.B. 415, 419 (U.K. 1894)
(terrorist acts of anarchists directed at private citizens are not acts directed against a
particular government but against all governments and persons generally, and thus are
not political offenses); In re Vogt, [1923-1924] Ann. Dig. 285 (No. 165) (Switzerland,
Fed. Ct., 1924) ("To seize as hostages private persons who have no part in the quarrel
• . . cannot. . . be regarded as a means justified by its political end"); COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AM. BRANCH OF THE INT'L LAW ASSOCIATION, PRO-

CEEDINGS AND COMMITTEE REPORTS 126, 145-46, 148 (1985-86); Garcia-Mora,

Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition of Political Offenders,
62 MICH. L. REV. 927, 942-53 (1964); J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 45-56 (1985); but see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799-801 (9th Cir.
1986) (wrongly limiting violation of international law exception regarding "crimes
against humanity" to crimes by government officials or those acting "with the toleration
of" such officials), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1987). Cf id. at 806 (terrorism).
33. See, e.g., Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 221-32; Paust, Aggression
Against Authority, supra note 16, at 284-85. Commentators have also recognized that no
state can lawfully enter -into a treaty "contemplating the performance of any . . . act
criminal under international law" or "conniving at the commission of [such] acts." See
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 61 AM. J. INT'L
L. 263, 409 (1967) [hereinafter Draft Articles] (Commentary No. 3 to draft art. 50 and
draft art. 50 concerning jus cogens). Such a treaty is void because "it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted."
Draft Articles, supra, at 409. See also Draft Articles, supra (example of "treaties violat-
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Genocide Convention, which a given case may arguably involve, expressly affirms that genocide and related conduct "shall not be considered
as political crimes for the purpose of extradition." 3' 4 Such trends apparently have conditioned Italian and United States perspectives at least to
the point where they recognize a general presumption of non-immunity
for international crime under the political offense clause. 5 More generally, one should recognize that international crimes are inherently
nonpolitical because they are not merely crimes against a particular state
or political institution but are crimes against humankind over which universal jurisdiction exists.
Certainly no perpetrator of this type of crime could reasonably expect
that acts taken in violation of international law, over which there exists
universal jurisdiction and no general immunity from prosecution, constitute political offenses affording an immunity from extradition. A request
for such immunity is actually a request that the judiciary act contrary to
public policy and several general obligations of the state under international law. Such a claim functions as a request that the court sanctify
violations of international law by the individual and propagate new violations of international law by the state. A court of law must not do this.
Thus, an individual's violation of international law poses the one necessary exception to the political offense exception.
C.

No PoliticalProsecutions

A related political offense concern is probably not involved. Under
both the Hostages Convention and the general extradition treaty Italy
could refuse extradition to the United States if the United States Executive was intent on prosecuting the individuals involved "for a political
offense," 3 6 or, as the Hostages Convention notes, "on account of [their]
race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion" or if one
could show that their "position may be prejudiced" for any such reason.37 Indeed, if Italy could foresee that the United States would violate
the fundamental human rights of such persons to freedom from discrimi-

ing human rights").
34. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. VII, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. I share the viewpoint of most that the prohibition of genocide now at least is customary. See Paust, Aggression Against Authority,
supra note 16, at 293 n.64.
35. See supra note 30.
36. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 19, at art. V(1), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at
1528.
37. See 1979 Hostages Convention, supra note 9, at art. 9(1).
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nation on the basis of "race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion," 3 then Italy would have an obligation under more general
international law to refuse extradition and, thus, to refuse to become a
complicitor in the deprivation of fundamental human rights."

38. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, at art. 2; M.
H. LASSWELL, L. CHEN, supra note 11, at 272-74, 302, 325-27 (legal
status of the Declaration), 564-68, 909, 916-18 (norm of nondiscrimination).
39. See generally Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 218-19, 226-27. See
also supra note 11; infra note 54; DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 702
(nonexclusive listing of state violations of customary international law if, "as a matter of
state policy, it . ..encourages or condones" certain human right prohibitions), § 711
(denial of justice and state responsibility) and reporters' notes 1-2 thereto; Garcia-Mora,
The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L.
REV. 1226, 1226, 1228-29, 1238-39 (1962); Singer, Terrorism, Extradition, and FSIA
Relief. The Letelier Case, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 75-79 (1986) (addressing
"humanitarian exception" to extradition); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to French Minister, 1793 ("until a reformation of the criminal codes of most nations, to deliver fugitives
from them would be to become their accomplices"), quoted in Ex parte Kaine, 14 F.
Cas. 78, 81 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 7,597); Paust, Introduction, supra note 27. On
individual responsibility for complicitous involvement in international crime, see also
Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L.
REv. 99, 166-69 (1972); 1979 Hostages Convention, supra note 9, at art. 2(b).
One should also note that a country must not expel or return a person that the Refugee Convention covers (i.e., a person outside one's country "owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion") "in any manner whatsoever . . . where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of" such categories of discrimination. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, arts. l(A)(2), 33(1), 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
Protocol] (United States is a signatory to the Protocol and thus indirectly to the Convention). There are some exceptions regarding explusion. See, e.g., id. at arts. 1 (F) ("serious
non-political crime," "war crime," "crime against humanity"), 32, 33(2). But no such
McDOUGAL,

exceptions exist with respect to nonreturn (nonrefoulement). See also Goldman & Martin, InternationalLegal StandardsRelating to the Rights of Aliens and Refugees and
United States Immigration Law, 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 302, 312-13 (1983). Additionally, an
express right of access to courts exists. See Protocol, supra, at arts. 16, 32(2); see also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, at arts. 8, 14(1). As a treaty,
this is supreme federal law. In the United States, it should also prevail in the case of an
unavoidable clash with a mere bilateral extradition treaty, and as human rights law
through the United Nations Charter obligations (e.g., arts. 55(c), 56) such law of
nonrefoulement should prevail through article 103 of the Charter in the face of any other
inconsistent treaty obligation. More generally, of course, Italy and the United States
must not become complicitors with respect to foreign state human rights deprivations. See
supra.
The Universal Declaration also allows the United States to grant "asylum from persecution," see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, at art. 141), but
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This, of course, provides an answer to Professor Franck's intriguing
question concerning extradition of German nationals of Jewish faith to
Nazi Germany. If the United States extradited such persons, at least
today, to a foreseeable deprivation of fundamental human rights, the
United States officials involved would themselves become complicitors in
the deprivation of such rights. Further, the United States, contrary to its
obligations under the United Nations Charter, would become a complicitor as well (unless the official acts were classified as ultra vires) and the
United States would engage in conduct constituting a denial of justice
under customary international law. Surely no nation-state should do this
and, because international law is part of supreme federal law, no United
States official, executive or judicial, should allow this to occur.
D.

Claimed Lack ofJurisdictionin the United States

Italy should also refuse extradition to the United States if it can show
that the United States lacks jurisdiction under relevant principles of international law. It is well-recognized that a nation-state does not have
jurisdiction to enforce if, under international law, it has no jurisdiction to
prescribe.40 Fortunately, however, the United States has jurisdiction
under the universality theory with respect to any customary international
crimes involving hostage-taking, such as acts of genocide or violations of
customary human rights.4
Yet violations of the Hostages Convention pose a problem. The Hostages Convention, one might argue, creates a new crime 42 that operates

this is largely discretionary (the right is to "seek and to enjoy" if granted). The power to
grant asylum, as a broad customary power tied also to human rights law (the "right to
seek"), should also prevail in case of an unavoidable clash with a bilateral extradition
treaty, except of course in the case of international crime. See, e.g., Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 32, at art. 14(2); Refugee Convention, supra, at arts.
1(F)(a), (c); Paust, Aggression Against Authority, supra note 16, at 284-85.

40. See, e.g., Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads:An Intersection
Between Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 292 (1982);
Paust, FederalJurisdiction, supra note 7, at 199-201; DRAF-r RESTATEMENT, supra
note 8, at § 431(1) and comment a thereto (lack of competence under international law
"may be objected to both by the affected person directly and by the state concerned").
41. See, e.g., Paust, FederalJurisdiction, supra note 7, at 211-15, 223-25; Paust,

Aggression Against Authority, supra note 16, at 290-93.
42. But see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, arts. 3, 5, 9;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 7, 9, 10, approved by U.N.
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); Decision of the Human Rights Committee on Abduc-

tion, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40), at 176-89 (1981);

DRAFT RESTATEMENT,

supra

note 8, at 305 (reporters' note 1 to § 432); Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at
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on so-called universal jurisdiction by treaty, a jurisdictional competence
that the treaty signatories recognized and which is limited to themselves."' Since Palestinian defendants may not be nationals of any signatory to the Convention,,if the treaty creates a new crime, it would seem
to follow that signatories could not rightly prosecute such non-national
defendants under the Convention and domestic implementing laws. The
prosecuting state would have to demonstrate that customary international
law already recognizably proscribed the relevant criminal activity and
subjected perpetrators to criminal sanctions. To do so would not be difficult if one could classify the acts of the defendants as conduct violating
fundamental human rights based in customary international law. If so, it
would not seem to matter that the Hostages Convention supplements a
customary prohibition and a jurisdictional competence already extant
under the universality principle.
In my view, hostage-taking implicates such customary human rights
law." Indeed, strategies of impermissible terrorism necessarily involve
violations of human rights laws that are as civilly and criminally sanctionable as any deprivation of fundamental human rights. 45 In this respect, Judge Bork's citation of my writings in his Tel-Oren opinion is
misleading." The point my writings actually made was that despite disagreement concerning a definition of terrorism, one can recognize an adequate and neutral definition, 41 and it is important to note that human
rights law already proscribes strategies of impermissible terrorism regardless of name. 48 Indeed, soon after Tel-Oren the United Nations recognizably condemned "all acts of terrorism . . . in all its forms, wher-

194 & n.14, 213, 231.
43. See generally, Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 214 & n.89; Paust,
Introduction, supra note 27; Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158, 160 (1987).
44. See supra note 42.
45. See supra notes 41-42. On human rights sanctions generally, see also Report of
the Committee on Human Rights, supra note 11; Paust, Litigating Human Rights,
supra note 11; infra notes 54, 57.
46. See Tel-Oren' v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 811 (1985), citing Paust, "Nonprotected" Persons or Things
(hereinafter Paust, "Nonprotected" Persons), in LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 32, at 341,
355-56.
47. See Paust, "Nonprotected" Persons, in LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 32, at 34552, 370-76, 393; Bassiouni, An International Control Scheme for the Prosecution of
InternationalTerrosim, in LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 32, at 576-77, 613-14; Paust,
Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 192-94; Terrorism and "Terrorism-Specific"
Statutes, 7 TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 233 (1984). See also infra note 73.
48. See, e.g., supra notes 41-42.
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' as did the United States Congress.5"
ever and by whomever committed" 49

E.

The Toscanino Problem

An additional difficulty for the United States might involve a claim
that whatever jurisdictional competence the United States might have
would be obviated if the United States has acquired control of the defendants, directly or through Italy, by its own violation of international
law. One might argue, for example, that the United States violated international law when it coerced the Egyptian aircraft by the threat or use
of armed force to land in Italian territory. One might argue that the
international community cannot tolerate lawless enforcement of the law.

49. See, e.g., Note by the President of the Security Council, Oct. 9, 1985, U.N. Doc.
S/17554 (on behalf of the members of the Council, also endorsing the Secretary General's statement of Oct. 8, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1565 (1985); S.C. Res. 579,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986); U.N. G.A. Res. 40/
61, 40 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239
(1986); Paust, Terrorism and the InternationalLaw of War, 64 MIL. L. REV. 1, 21
(1974), reprinted in 14 REV. DE DROIT PENAL MIL. ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 13
(1975). See also United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1294 (1970) ("Every
State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
. . .terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts . . ."and "no State shall organize,
assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate . . . terrorist . . . activities directed towards the
violent overthrow of the regime of another State. . ."); Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986
I.C.J. 14, paras. 191, 192, 202, 205 ("support for subversive or terrorist armed activities
within another State"), 209, 292(9), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986).
A question remains, however, whether the United Nations actually meant to cover a
gap in the customary law of armed conflict and Geneva law that allowed certain forms of
terroristic tactics against combatants during an armed conflict. See Paust, Terrorism and
the InternationalLaw of War, supra, at 27-31. That the context of armed conflict was
fully considered is not evident. Nevertheless, the phrase "wherever and by whomever
committed" is quite broad, and the preambular portion of the resolution did refer at least
to "relevant instruments on international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts." In any event, those who targeted the Achille Lauro were certainly not directing
their terroristic tactics of hostage-taking against combatants, and such acts remain impermissible under customary laws of armed conflict and Geneva law. See, e.g., Paust, Ter-

rorism and the InternationalLaw of War, supra, at 14-19, 31-32.
50. See H.R. Con. Res. 228, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), §§ 1(1), 4(b), reprinted in
24 I.L.M. 1562, 1563-64 (1985); International Security and Development Cooperation
Act of 1985, §§ 503, 505, 507-508, 558 (4), Pub. L. No. 99-83 (Aug. 8, 1985), reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 1558, 1558-59, 1562 (1985).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 20.235

Such a claim by Italy, as a ground for refusing extradition to the
United States, would hardly make sense at this late date because Italy
has itself taken advantage of any claimed impropriety and has prosecuted
the hostage-takers. Nevertheless, one should not dismiss lightly the importance of the claim, based in part on the United Nations Charter. According to United States cases, including United States v. Toscanino,",
the kidnapping of foreign nationals abroad by United States agents without foreign state consent violates the United Nations Charter and, if
egregious enough, will lead to a nullification of jurisdiction to prosecute. 52 Some lower federal courts have recognized that the foreign state
can later waive an infraction of its territorial integrity, 53 but early Supreme Court opinions may deny waiver of an independent right of the
private defendant to remedial relief." Moreover, if the incident also involved a governmental violation of human rights, no foreign state could
waive the private right any more than a foreign state could recognize or
grant some form of immunity for a deprivation of human rights erga
55
omnes.
If the United States violated international law, then even if Italy chose
to extradite the accused to the United States, the individual defendants
should have standing to raise the Toscanino defense to jurisdiction in a
United States federal court. If the court did not find the alleged violation
to be egregious enough to obviate prosecution, the defendants should still
have standing, a cause of action and the right to a civil remedy in United
51. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974).
52. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274,
277-79; see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1933) (illegal seizure
voided); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (illegal seizure voided); Rose v.
Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276-77 (1808) (courts will disregard foreign judicial
decrees if foreign jurisdiction is inconsistent with the law of nations). Cf DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 433, reporters' note 3. For additional recognition of the
duty of United States officials "to observe with good faith and scrupulous care" the U.N.
Charter and relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions during the process of extradition,
see United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp. 29, 31, 33 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Toscanino also
applied a relevant Security Council resolution. See 500 F.2d at 277-78.
53. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67-68.
54. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 369-79 (1824). See also DRAFT
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at 293 (comment a to § 431), 305 (reporters' note 1 to §
432), 485 (comment a to § 711), 500 (comment e thereto), 506 (reporters' note 2 thereto)
(denial of access to domestic courts, judicial denial of human rights and denial of remedies for injury inflicted by the state or a private person constitute "denial of justice" for
which the state is responsible); supra note 11.
55. See, e.g., supra notes 14-15, 17; Paust, Aggression Against Authority, supra
note 16, at 284-85.
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States courts,5 6 especially for a violation of their human rights.57 I have

argued elsewhere, however, that under the circumstances, the United
States diversion of the Egyptian airliner did not involve a violation of
international law but, on the contrary, was a permissible use of force "in
the common interest" reasonably necessary and proportionate to ensure
the enforcement of international criminal law. 8 The United States did
not direct the act against Egyptian territorial integrity or political independence as such, and, on balance, the act was arguably consistent with
the purposes of the United Nations Charter. As such, the action did not
violate article 2(4) of the Charter or article 14 of the Hostages Convention,5" and the court should deny the defendants' claims to nullify prosecution efforts.

56. See, e.g., supra notes 52, 54. See also Paust, LitigatingHuman Rights, supra
note 11; supra note 11.
57.

See also Paust, Aggression Against Authority, supra note 16, at 302; Paust, On

Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an
Effective Remedy in U.S. Courts (forthcoming) [hereinafter On Human Rights].
58. See, e.g., Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of
Force Abroad, 8 WnrrrIEa L. REv. 711, 726-28 (1986); Paust, Aggression Against
Authority, supra note 16, at 300 n.97. For partly supportive views, see Bazyler, Captur-

ing Terrorists in the 'Wild Blue Yonder': InternationalLaw and the Achille Lauro
and Libyan Aircraft Incidents, 8 WHITTIER L. REv. 685, 698-99, 701-03, 705, 707-09
(1986) (rightly noting that several international instruments did not apply to the Egyptian aircraft's flight, that article 51 of the Charter was not applicable for the United
States and that the United States had a claim under the doctrines of state responsibility,
"hot pursuit" and self-help with respect to Egypt's failure to arrest the suspects); Gooding, supra note 43, at 171-72, 175-77 (but see Gooding, supra note 43, at 163, 168, 170

n.91, 172-73); McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Terrorism: The United
States Response to Achille Lauro-QuestionsofJurisdiction and Its Exercise, 16 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 435, 459-60, 464-66 (1986) (wrongly using self-defense rationale;

arguing self-help rationale); Note, The Achille Lauro Incident and the Permissible Use
of Force, 9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 481 (1987); Note, An Analysis of the Achille

Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 328, 347, 359-62, 367 (1985-1986); but see
id., at 330-32, 362-65, 367; McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implicationsfor InternationalLaw, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691, 718-21 (1985); Note, Use of Force: Interception of Aircraft, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 761 (1986). Cf id., at 770.
59. See supra note 58. Additionally, such a use of force was not an "arbitrary" interference with liberty interests protected by human rights law but a reasonably necessary
and proportionate effort to assure enforcement of international criminal law. Cf supra
note 42.
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PROSECUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

As I noted, the United States arguably has jurisdiction under the
universality principle if the defendants ever arrive in the United States.
Universal jurisdiction by treaty under the Hostages Convention, or jurisdiction under article 5(d) thereof, which adopts the victim or passive personality theory, 0 is highly suspect with regard to defendants who are not
nationals of a signatory to the Hostages Convention. A basis under international law (i.e., the universality principle) can exist, however, which
permits the United States to use whatever statutory basis for prosecution
it finds convenient. Such domestic legislation exists, at least, in the form
of the 1984 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-taking and Aircraft Sabotage."
Moreover, since its founding the United States has exercised universal
enforcement jurisdiction against individuals found within its territory. 2
In view of that history and rediscovered views concerning the self-executing nature of United States treaties, one can even argue that a statute is
not necessary to impose domestic criminal sanctions for violations of international law.63 Additionally, one may note that any claims of the defendants to sovereign immunity or related claims to immunity from prosecution are unavailable under international and United States domestic
law in the case of infractions of international law. 4
Nonetheless, the United States indictments of Mr. Abbas and the four
hostage-takers in 1985 raise other concerns. Although one of the offenses

60. See generally Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 201-02.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 1985). Under § 1203(b)(1)(C), if the acts occur abroad
and neither the perpetrator nor the hostage victim is a United States national, see §
1203(b)(1)(A), and the offender is not "found in the United States," see § 1203(b)(1)(B),
"the governmental organization sought to be compelled" must be "the Government of the
United States." One can argue, however, that if several governments are sought to be
coerced, the fact that the United States government is one such government is sufficient if
the acts occur abroad and none of the other exceptions, e.g., (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B), apply. Thus, the statute is ambiguous with respect to attempts to coerce several governments, a circumstance which arose in the case of the Achille Lauro hostage-taking. Nevertheless, the statute applies because United States nationals were victims. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203(b)(1)(A).
62. See, e.g., Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 211-13.
63. See Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and
InternationalLaw: The Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule Concerning Clashes Between Treaties, Custom and Federal Statutes (with a Restatement of the Draft Restatement) (forthcoming in 28 VA. J. INT'L L. No. 2).
64. See, e.g., Paust, FederalJurisdiction, supra note 7, at 221-47; see also Draft
Brief, supra note 14; Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
F.2d
(2d Cir. Sept. 11, 1987).
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that the indictments specified was hostage-taking, and such is proper, the
Executive claimed that the accused also engaged in acts of "piracy as
defined by the law of nations. '' 5 As most individuals who have addressed the matter recognize, however, the claim is almost per se invalid. 6 Contrary to the Executive's claim that seizure and control of the
vessel Achille Lauro was "for private ends,' 6 7 which is a necessary element of the crime of piracy under the law of nations, the motives and
ends were obviously political in nature regardless of the nationality or
other status of the perpetrators or of Palestinians more generally. That
the Palestinian faction involved had insurgent status, lacking as it does
any viable control of territory, may or may not be the case.6 8 Yet such a
status is not necessary in order to conclude that the parties engaged in
relevant conduct for non-private (i.e., political) ends. 9
An additional problem with the indictment for piratical acts is the fact
that United States cases have recognized that piracy under the law of
nations does not occur when the seizure of control and other acts origi-

65. See 24 I.L.M. 1554, 1556-57 (1985); see also id. at 1515 (Remarks of President
Reagan, Oct. 11, 1985), 1517 (Briefing by Robert McFarlane, Oct. 11, 1985).
66. See, e.g., Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901, 910-11 (1986);
Note, Towards a New Definition of Piracy:The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L
L. 723, 724, 737-43, 747-48 (1986). Cf McGinley, supra note 58, at 697-99; but see
Gooding, supra note 43, at 159.
67. See 24 I.L.M. at 1557. Even the Legal Adviser to the United States Department
of State recognized that the acts were primarily for political ends and outside coverage of
the 1958 Geneva and 1982 United Nations law of the sea conventions. See Sofaer, supra
note 66, at 910-11. He added, however, that the perpetrators "stole money and jewelry."
Id. at 910.
68. For relevant criteria, see, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, War CrimesJurisdictionand
Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11-15
(1978). In my opinion, the Palestine Liberation Organization does not meet the test even
for insurgent status (lacking as it obviously does the effective control of territory). It does
not follow that Palestinians as such are not members of a nation. For evidence of a
different sort of "status" for the Palestine Liberation Organization, see McGinley, supra
note 58, at 700.
69. See Note, supra note 66, at 730, 733, 735-43, 749; Dinstein, supra note 14, at
56; Green, The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates,37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 496, 497-98
(1961); McCredie, supra note 58, at 447; Sofaer, supra note 66, at 910-11; Vali, The
Santa Maria Case, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 168, 174 (1961); see also J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 203 (2d ed. 1981); Paust, The
Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774, 778, 804-05 (1976); cf. McGinley, supra note 58, at 697; but see id. at 698-700; The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408,
411-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (if no belligerent status). A United States case rejecting the
piratical label in the context of a belligerency was Dole v. New England Mutual Marine
Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1864) (No. 3,966). For other labels of the
acts involved, see also supra note 31.
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nate from the same vessel.7 0 That modern treaty law has retained the
same limitation found in prior customary law is highly probable. 1 For
these reasons, the indictment for piracy is per se invalid and, moreover,
cannot support a request for extradition. The charge of hostage-taking
remains, however.
Finally, although the United States has useful new legislation for
prosecuting certain acts of terrorism in the 1984 hostage-taking legislation, significant gaps in federal legislation still remain. If Congress is
serious about assuring effective sanctions against all forms of impermissible terrorism, and one must assume that Congress is serious, 2 then legislative efforts realistically designed to reach all forms of terrorism should
result in the adoption of either a new statute proscribing acts of international terrorism as such"3 or the draft legislation offered previously on
Offenses Against Human Rights.7 4
Additionally, it is worth checking to assure that any new forms of
legislation in related areas are not detrimental to efforts to better effectuate both civil and criminal sanctions against strategies of terrorism violative of fundamental human rights.7 At several levels an inescapable link

70.

See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 635, 642-43 (1818).

See also Note, supra note 66, at 742 (the Santa Maria incident), citing M.

McDOUGAL

W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 821-22 (1962); Dinstein, supra note
14, at 56-57; McCredie, supra note 58, at 444-45.
71. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 15(1)(a) ("directed. . . against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft"), 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2137 T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 90 (emphasis added); 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
art. 101, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); Note,
supra note 66, at 725, 727-28, 731-37, 742-43, 748-49 & n.127; McCredie, supra note
58, at 445-46, 448; McGinley, supra note 58, at 696. But see McGinley, supra note 58,
at 696-97 (also misconstruing a United States case, United States v. The Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 229, 232-33 (1844)). Article 15(1)(b) of the 1958 Convention does not apply because acts on an Italian flag vessel are within the jurisdiction of
Italy (i.e., not "outside the jurisdiction of any State").
72. See supra note 50.
73. See Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 215-16, 250-51. See also H.R.
Con. Res. 228, supra note 50, at § 4(b), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. at 1564; International
Security and Development Cooperation Act, supra note 50, at § 507 (the United States
should negotiate an international treaty that includes "an operative definition of terrorism"); supra note 47.
74. See Paust, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 7, at 216, 250.
75. For a draft resolution of Congress to better effectuate human rights, see 81
PRoc., AM. Soc. INT'L L. (1987) (forthcoming). See also supra note 54 (state responsibility to provide access to courts and allow private remedy for violation of human rights);

Paust, On Human Rights, supra note 57.

1987]

NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS

between impermissible acts of terrorism and violations of human rights
exists. When human rights are furthered, terrorism is necessarily set
back." For several reasons, an effective assurance of human rights and
effective use of civil and criminal sanctions against the deprivation of
human rights by governments and private perpetrators will bring an end
to terrorism.

76. See also Paust, The Link, supra note 10.

